osexual lovemaking is incorrect: This distinction turns out to be more modern than either the Bill of Rights or the Fourteenth Amendment.
After carefully examining the Justices' historical claims, this Comment examines the interrelations between their differing use of "privacy," understandings of "homosexuality," and political values. The Comment will argue that the political philosophies underlying the majority and dissenting opinions in Hardwick inform the Justices' definitions of "privacy" and interact with their differing understandings of "homosexuality." The majority's understanding of homosexuality as immoral corresponded with its willingness to justify criminal prohibitions by reference to morality. In contrast, the dissenters' understanding of homosexuality as a normal human variation coincided with the importance they attach to preserving individual liberty.
This Comment explores the relationships between the Justices' understandings of homosexuality and their political values by comparing the Hardwick opinions to an earlier dispute over whether consensual lovemaking should be a crime: the celebrated Hart-Devlin debate. The Comment concludes with some thoughts on the probable effects of Hardwick on future constitutional litigation.
I. THE JUSTICES' DOCTRINAL DISAGREEMENTS
Writing for the majority, Justice White announced that the constitutional right of privacy did not protect even private and consensual homosexual sodomy. White narrowly limited the Court's earlier privacy cases to their facts, 10 and refused to extend them, arguing that substantive due process rights not found in the text of the Constitution, such as the right of privacy, should not represent merely the Justices' own values. 1 Such rights must either be "'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition,' "" or "'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,' such that 'neither liberty nor justice would exist if [they] were sacrificed.' "" Because Justice White believed that every state that ratified the Bill of Rights and all but five of those that ratified the Fourteenth Amendment proscribed homosexual sodomy," he perceived any claim that homosexual sodomy involved a "substantive due process" right to be "facetious."' 5 White concluded that recognizing a fundamental right to "homosexual sodomy" would exceed the Court's institutional limits." 6 Because Hardwick had no fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy,'" the Court sought
The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 97: 1073 merely a rational basis" 8 for Georgia's statute. White's opinion held that the "presumed belief of a majority of the electorate in Georgia that homosexual sodomy is immoral and unacceptable"' 9 was sufficient justification for the law. Writing separately, Chief Justice Burger emphasized the "ancient roots" of proscriptions against "homosexual sodomy." 20 In dissent, Justice Blackmun rejected the majority's framing of the issue. For Blackmun, the case involved not merely a right to perform homosexual sodomy, but "the fundamental interest all individuals have in controlling the nature of their intimate associations with others,"'" or, even more broadly, "'the right to be let alone.' "22 Blackmun articulated two reasons for framing the issues expansively. First, he thought that because the statute used anatomical rather than gender-based proscriptions, it should not be tested "as applied" to homosexuals alone. Selective enforcement of Georgia's statute might confer standing on a "practicing homosexual," but no enforcement pattern could narrow the language of a statute that made both gender and marital status irrelevant. 2 3 Second, Justice Blackmun believed "sexual intimacy" to be "'a sensitive, key relationship of human existence, central to family life, community welfare, and the development of human personality.' "24 He thought it as "central a part of an individual's life" 2 5 as the activities already protected by the constitutional right of privacy. Although he would have applied a stricter test, 2 6 Blackmun argued that the Georgia law lacked even a rational basis: Georgia had not proved that private, consensual homosexual sodomy caused 18 . Under both the equal protection and due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court has calibrated its scrutiny of challenged laws to the interests it perceives to be involved in the case. When no interest justifying greater vigilance appears to be at stake, the Court is deferential to legislative judgments. In these cases it requires only that the law have a "rational basis": a reasonable relationship to a legitimate public purpose based on some conception of the general public good. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 994-96 (1978) .
The Court's least deferential review is reserved for cases in which a suspect classification, such as race, has been employed, or where a fundamental right has been impaired. Review in these cases is called "strict scrutiny." It is usually fatal. 19. 478 U.S. at 196. Reasoning that "the law is constantly based on morality," the majority was "unpersuaded" "that majority sentiments about the morality of homosexuality should be declared inadequate." Id. any form of tangible harm.1 7 Blackmun also emphatically rejected the argument that "ancient" notions of immorality insulate sodomy statutes from review. 2 " Justice Stevens' dissent took a different approach. It argued that, because prohibitions against sodomy applied historically to married and unmarried participants, of the same and of different sexes, 2 9 the Court's rationale for upholding sodomy statutes must apply just as broadly. Stevens therefore considered whether Georgia could enact a neutral law prohibiting sodomy by all persons without exception,"° and, if not, whether it could save the statute from being found unconstitutional by selectively enforcing it against homosexuals. Stevens concluded that neither course was permissible, because the "essential 'liberty'" recognized in the Court's prior privacy cases encompassed the right of both married and unmarried heterosexual couples to engage in nonreproductive sexual conduct, and because every citizen has the same subjective interest in such liberty. 1 Stevens could find no neutral and legitimate interest to support selectively enforcing a generally applicable sodomy law against homosexuals; he thought Georgia's asserted interest amounted to nothing more substantial than "habitual dislike . . . or ignorance."32 Indeed, Stevens argued that It is difficult to characterize "homosexuality" as a condition so similar to race and sex as to be a protected category without severely narrowing the definition of homosexuality. Human sexuality appears to be polymorphous, not dimorphous. Most adults have some sexual interest in persons of their own gender, and very few have no other sexual interests at all. See A. KINSEY, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN MALE 636-56 (1948) . If equal protection of "homosexuals" benefited only persons with an exclusive, lifelong, sexual preference for others of their own gender, the category might be analogous to race or sex, but it would not include many of the people who violate Georgia's statute with others of the same gender, Furthermore, the potential power of equal protection analysis may be, paradoxically, its greatest practical weakness. An argument with less potential, which would be less threatening to those who fear that striking down sodomy laws will transform society beyond recognition, is more likely to win cases. Precisely because "an equal protection analysis seeks to unify the private and the political by protecting gay personhood as a whole . . . [and] could provide a comprehensive doctrinal framework for addressing the problem of gay inequality," Suspect Classification, supra, at 1297, it would be a much larger step to strike down a sodomy law on equal protection grounds than on privacy grounds. Courts have uniformly rejected attempts to legitimize homosexual marriage, for example, a result that would probably follow if homosexuals were held to be entitled to equal protection of the laws. The doctrinal disputes among the Justices in Hardwick proceeded from more basic differences regarding the meanings of "privacy" and "homosexuality." This Section explores that level of disagreement.
A. "Privacy"
"Privacy" is an evocative word, but courts have been unable to give it precise meaning. When Michael Hardwick's lawyers claimed that his arrest violated his "right to privacy," they explicitly compared his desire to be uninterrupted in sexual activity in his own bedroom to the desire of a heterosexual couple to use birth control without interference, or the desire of a woman to terminate an early pregnancy. 37 The Court therefore faced two basic and related questions: What was the nature of the "pri- Justice White's conclusion can be self-evident only to those who share his implicit, unarticulated assumptions about the nature of homosexuality and "homosexual sodomy." Recognizing and evaluating the diverse ways in which the Justices conceptualized homosexuality is therefore crucial to understanding their disagreements over this case. This task does not involve an assessment of judicial attitudes toward a known, objectively existing entity. Rather, the task is to discern the paradigms each Justice used to understand the essential nature of Hardwick's activity on that August morning. Although what Hardwick had done was clear, 40 evaluating whether an arrest was a constitutionally permissible response required a more profound understanding of his activity than accurate fact-finding alone can provide.
B. Five Conceptions of "Homosexuality"
The majority opinion is written as if the term "homosexual" solved, rather than confused, the problem of evaluating Hardwick's actions in terms of his constitutional rights. Yet, like "privacy," "homosexuality" lacks an unambiguous, 41 uncontroversial, meaning. In the Hardwick opin-
38.
The litigants' briefs were argued in terms of these two basic questions. Georgia's brief characterized the "common principles of this Court's privacy decisions [as] revolv[ing] around marriage, the family, the home and decisions as to whether through procreation the ancient cycles will begin again and, if so, in what manner the new generation will be brought up. Hardwick's lawyers in federal court obscured the specific facts, however, by consistently using the statutory term "sodomy" to describe them.
41. The term "homosexuality" is lexically ambiguous because it can refer either to desire or to conduct. See, e.g., WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICMONARY 544 (1981) ( defining homosexuality as "1: the manifestation of sexual desire toward a member of one's own sex; 2: erotic activity with a member of one's own sex"). Although it may at first appear that all members of the Court focus The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 97: 1073 ions one may discern at least five very different conceptions of "homosexuality": that it is (1) immoral, 4. (2) criminally harmful, (3) a manifestation of illness, (4) an identity, and (5) a normal variation of human sexuality. The first two of these focus primary upon actions, the last three upon desire. 4 The sources for the Justices' conceptions of homosexuality were equally various. Justice White and Chief Justice Burger relied upon what they claimed were historical conceptions of "homosexual sodomy" that they assumed informed the framers' vision of the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment. Claiming to be uninfluenced by their personal preferences, 44 these Justices also relied on the "presumed belief of a majority of the electorate in Georgia that homosexuality is immoral. ' 45 By comparing "homosexual sodomy" to other crimes, and relying on other sodomy statutes in effect in 1791 and 1868, 4 1 Justice White also implied that homosexual sodomy is criminally harmful. 47 Similarly, Chief Justice Burger's references to "millennia of moral teaching" implied that homosexuality is immoral.' Justice Powell's concern that a long prison sentence for a single private, consensual act of homosexual sodomy might violate the Eighth Amendment proscription against cruel and unusual punishment 49 may reflect a belief that homosexuality is an illness, or a perception that it is no longer generally regarded as a serious crime. assumption that "homosexuality" is a normal human variation. 5 1 Justice Blackmun also linked homosexuality to personality or identity, 52 relying on the views of "mental health professionals." 5 " Stevens ironically relied on the apparent values of the Georgia electorate and prosecutor." Each of these conceptions, and the Justices' support for them, will be evaluated in turn. ., dissenting) ; id. at 214 n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Because the Georgia law did not single out homosexual acts for proscription, it is unlikely that the electorate, or its representatives in the legislature, intended the law to be applied to homosexual conduct only. The legislative history suggests instead particular concern with heterosexual sodomy. See id. at 200 & n.1 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (statute's "purpose seems to have been to broaden the coverage of the law to reach heterosexual as well as homosexual activity"). Moreover, even Michael Hardwick, who had been caught violating the law and had publicly declared his intention to do so again, was not prosecuted, suggesting that Georgia officials condoned secluded and consensual homosexual lovemaking. See id. at 219-20 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice White's majoritarian argument relied, therefore, not upon facts but upon conservative political principles, as will be explored in Section III infra.
The Majority
method. 59 Yet even if the goal of discerning historical attitudes in order to follow the framers' intent is accepted, the majority's depiction of eighteenth-and nineteenth-century views of sodomy is too flawed to guide constitutional interpretation.
In 1791, when the Bill of Rights was adopted, three states' criminal statutes singled out sexual acts between men for special condemnation. 0 Eight of the other states' statutes 61 proscribed "buggery" 2 or "sodomy ' s 59. Even were Justice White's and Chief Justice Burger's historical claims absolutely correct, it would be possible to argue that they cast little light on "the framers' intentions," or that the framers' intentions ought not to be of controlling weight in constitutional interpretation. It is also possible to argue that the issue of how to interpret the Constitution ought not to be framed in this way, because neither the originalist nor the non-originalist position is a coherent one. See Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of Normative Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063 (1981). However, a general discussion of constitutional interpretation is beyond the scope of this Comment.
I do not agree with Justice White's and Chief Justice Burger's implicit assumptions that the framers' intentions are determinate and knowable, and that the Court's role is to discern and follow those intentions. However, I think that when the Court uses statements about the past to reach a result in a case, the truth or falsity of those statements is worth examining. 276 (London 1630) (justice of peace manual; "haec per confusionem sexuum, sc. home ove home, feme ove feme," citing the Bible). But see J. GILES, supra (3d ed. 1736) ("carnalis copula contra Naturam & haec vel per confusionem specierum, sc. a man or woman with a brute beast, vel. sexuum, a man with a man or a man with a woman") (emphasis added).
63. The term "sodomy" was used less frequently than "buggery." In English and American legal sources of the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries, "sodomy" had no definite meaning. It was sometimes a synonym for buggery. See, e.g., R. v. Wiseman, Fortes. 91, 95, 92 Eng. Rep. 774, 776 (1716) ("Sodomy is the genus, rem veneream habere in ano with a man is only a species, and with a woman is another species, and so with a boy or girl, is another species, and with a beast another species."); J. BACON, supra note 62 ("Sodomy"; "Sodomy . . .is an unnatural copulation between two human creatures, or between a human and a brute creature."); J. GILES, supra note 62 By 1868, when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, no additional states had singled out sexual acts between men for special prohibition." 6 Many states' statutes had been bowdlerized, however, and now prohibited "the crime against nature" 6 instead of "sodomy" or "buggery." 6 That phrase applied to acts of anal intercourse between men and women as well as between two men. 9 Courts in at least seven of the thirty-two 64. This was Maryland. Justice White asserted that Maryland's inhabitants were entitled to English common law, including the "common law" crime of "sodomy," 478 U.S. at 192 n.5, but he may have been incorrect. In English jurisprudence, sodomy was considered a statutory rather than a common law crime. See 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *215-16. Thus, merely receiving the common law was inadequate for Maryland to have adopted the English criminal proscription against sodomy; Maryland would have had to adopt 25 Hen. VIII ch.6 (1533) (discussed supra note 62).
Maryland's 1776 Declaration of Rights gave its inhabitants "the benefit of such of the English statutes, as existed at the time of their first emigration, and which, by experience, have been found applicable to their local and other circumstances. . . 65. This is Georgia. Justice White also asserted that the English "common law" crime of "sodomy" was in effect in Georgia, 478 U.S. at 192 n.5. Georgia adopted those "common laws of England, and such of the statute laws as were usually in force" in 1784. An Act for reviving and enforcing certain laws therein mentioned, 1784, reprinted in R. WATKINS, DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF GEORGIA 289 (Philadelphia 1800). In 1826, the Georgia legislature formally adopted a list of English laws in force in Georgia, compiled by William Schley. Thus, it appears that no proscription against buggery was "in force" at the time the Bill of Rights was adopted. It should be noted, however, that in 1817 Georgia adopted a statute proscribing "sodomy and bestiality" as part of a comprehensive penal code. See A DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA 350 (Milledgeville 1822). Moreover, in Savannah, Georgia, on March 25, 1734, two Lutheran pastors reported in a German-language diary that on that day there was an "execution of judgement" against a man who was to receive "three-hundred lashes under the gallows" after being "accused and convicted of sodomy and inciting others." J. KATZ 69. See, e.g., J. CHrrrY, supra note 62, at 49 (sodomy defined as "anal intercourse between human beings."); R. DEsTY, supra note 63, at 143, § 60(a) (1887) ("it is sexual connection per anum, with mankind or beast, but not with fowl." (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted)); J.
states Justice White found to have "criminal sodomy statutes in effect in 1868, ' 170 explicitly held that these statutes did not apply to oral-genital contact." Some treatise writers explicitly included sodomy in marriage within the statutory proscription. 2 Thus, the evidence does not support Justice White's conclusion that the framers could not have intended the Constitution to "extend a fundamental right to homosexuals to engage in acts of consensual sodomy." 7'3 American sodomy laws in force when the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment were ratified applied to acts performed by men with women as well as with one another. Only three of the thirteen original states singled out sex acts between men for proscription; the others prohibited "sodomy" and "buggery," terms denoting sex acts between men and women as well as between two men. Moreover, in both 1791 and 1868 MAY, THE LAW OF CRIMES 223, § 210 (1881) ("Sodomy. . .is the unnatural carnal copulation of one human being with another, or with a beast. . . .To constitute the offense between human beings, the act must be per anum.") (footnote omitted); W. RUSSELL, supra note 62, *815 ("man with man; or in the same unnatural manner with woman"); see also 478 U.S. at 215 n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing sources).
Georgia's modern statutory definition of "sodomy" may mislead the uninitiated to suppose that the word has always denoted oral-genital practices as well as anal intercourse. In fact, the meaning of sodomy has varied over the ages, connoting "in various times and places everything from ordinary heterosexual intercourse in atypical position to oral sexual contact with animals." J. BOSWELL, Perhaps the notoriety of Oscar Wilde's 1895 arrest, trial, and conviction for gross indecency affected judicial attitudes and beliefs on this side of the Atlantic. Beginning in 1897, American courts did sometimes apply proscriptions of "sodomy" or the "crime against nature" against oral-genital practices, but they acknowledged that this interpretation changed the common law. Courts in at least fourteen of the thirty-two states with "criminal sodomy statutes in effect in 1868," 478 U.S. at 193 n. 6, acknowledged that by applying the state's statute to oral-genital contact they were altering the common law meaning of sodomy; the earliest such decision was rendered in 1897. ical Greece and Rome, sexual practices between men were not uniformly condemned 7 " and some were widely accepted; 77 under Roman rule, even marriage between men was possible until at least 342 A.D. 7 Sexual acts between men were also openly tolerated by both church and state during the early Middle Ages 79 and among the male social elite in eighteenthcentury France. 80 By ignoring ancient tolerance to focus selectively on ancient proscriptions, the majority distorted the historical record. This distortion enabled the majority to present its choice of proscription over tolerance as if it were merely fidelity to "ancient roots,"' 1 and conformity with laws in force "throughout the history of Western Civilization." 8 "
The majority's use of the concept of homosexuality is flawed as well. All of the Justices seem to have assumed that "homosexuality" has been an invariant reality, outside of history. In fact, however, like most ways of describing aspects of the human condition, "homosexuality" is a cultural and historical artifact. No attitude toward "homosexuals" or "homosexuality" can really be identified before the mid-nineteenth century because the concept did not exist until then. Before the late 1800s, sexuality-whether tolerated or condemned-was something a person did, not what he or she was. 83 Although both the behavior and the desires we now 77. Among the Greeks, for example, there were many shadings and variations of acceptance and disapproval of sex between men, depending upon such factors as the city, social class, precise historical time, relative ages, and the "manliness" or "effeminacy" of the participants. See generally K.J. Do-VER, GREEK HOMOSEXUALTrrY (1978) . There was a prejudice againstfreeborn, adult men taking the "passive" role in any sexual relationship, either with a woman or with another man. See, e.g., M.
FOUCAULT, THE USE OF PLEASURE: VOLUME Two OF THE HISTORY OF SEXUALrrY 216-25 (R.

Hurley trans. 1985).
78. See J. BOSWELL, supra note 69, at 59, 73. 79. Id. at 293-95. Then, "[b]etween 1250 and 1300, homosexual activity passed from being completely legal in most of Europe to incurring the death penalty in all but a few contemporary compilations." Id. at 293. Until 1300, church law paralleled secular law, condemning and punishing homosexual activity only to the extent other non-marital sexual activity-including non-coital sex within marriage-was condemned and punished. Id. at 269-332. [Vol. 97: 1073
See
call "homosexual" existed in earlier eras, 8 4 our currently common assumption that persons who make love with others of their own sex are fundamentally different from the rest of humanity is only about one hundred years old. 5 Even the word "homosexual" is new. It was coined in the nineteenth century to express the new idea that a person's immanent and essential nature is revealed by the gender of his desired sex partner. 8 " The concept emerged around the time that sexuality began to seem a proper object of medical, as distinguished from clerical or judicial, concern. Before the invention of "homosexuality," sexual touchings between men were determined to be licit or illicit according to criteria that applied equally to heterosexual practices, such as the parts of the body involved, 7 the relative status of the parties, and whether the sexual drama conformed to sex role stereotypes. 8 8 Although illicit sexual acts were seen as sinful, immoral, criminal, or all three, before the 1870s illicit sexual acts between men were not seen as fundamentally different from, or necessarily worse than, illicit acts between a man and a woman. 9 Thus, by referring to "homosexual sodomy" in ancient times, in 1791, 
1978).
This surprising notion that "homosexuality" is a fairly modern way of conceptualizing human behavior and interests has come to be accepted by scholars only within the past ten or fifteen years. See Gilbert, supra note 83, at 61; Rousseau, The Pursuit of Homosexuality in the Eighteenth Century: "Utterly Confused Category" and/or Rich Repository?, 9 EIGHTEENTH CENTURY LIFE 132, 162 n.1 (1985) .
86. The nineteenth-century innovation consisted of identifying people by the gender of their sexual object choice:
The nineteenth-century homosexual became a personage, a past, a case history, and a childhood, in addition to being a type of life, a life form, and a morphology, with an indiscreet anatomy and possibly a mysterious physiology. Nothing that went into his total composition was unaffected by his sexuality. It was everywhere present in him: at the root of all his actions because it was their insidious and indefinitely active principle; written immodestly on his face and body because it was a secret that always gave itself away. 88. See M. FOUCAULT, supra note 77, at 220 (in classical Greece, acceptable sexuality involved domination of "feminine" partner by "masculine" partner); M. FOUCAULT, THE CARE OF THE SELF: VOLUME THREE OF THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY 189-90 (R. Hurley trans. 1986) (in Republican Rome, acceptable sexual partner for a male citizen was a woman or a slave); Flandrin, supra note 87, at 120-21 (discussing acceptable positions for intercourse, and rationales therefor, in fifteenth century Christian Europe).
89. The Georgia statute under which Hardwick was arrested reflects this tradition. It does not distinguish between heterosexual and homosexual acts, but instead prohibits particular, anatomically defined, touchings. See supra note 1 (quoting statute's language). and even in 1868, White and Burger were inserting their modern understanding of "homosexuality" anachronistically into systems of values organized on other principles, obscuring the relative novelty of the distinction between "homosexuality" and "heterosexuality" with a myth about its antiquity. Moreover, their anachronistic myth distorted the meaning "homosexuality" had for its nineteenth-century inventors. Nineteenthcentury medical theories about "homosexuality" seem to have developed out of contemporaneous theories about the dangers of sexual arousal and satisfaction, and the debilitating effects of masturbation. 9 " The concept was introduced as a medical category, 1 and was intended to rebut the idea that sex between men could be either sinful or criminal. 2 "Homosexuality," in the nineteenth century, implied that sexual inclinations toward a person of one's own sex are beyond one's control (at least without professional treatment)." Using the nineteenth-century medical category of homosexuality to justify the law's treatment of sex between men as criminal thus precisely inverts the term's historical significance.
The Dissenters' Justifications for the Idea of Homosexuality as Normal Variation and Identity
In order to decide this case, the Court had to choose among inconsistent paradigms for "homosexuality." The conceptions relied on by the majority do not exhaust current thinking on this issue. Alternate conceptions adopted by the dissenters treat homosexuality as an identity and as a biologically normal variation of human sexuality.' The dissenters justified these views by reference to modern scientific consensus and to one tendency among contemporary values; 9 5 Justice Stevens, ironically but correctly, 9 6 also relied on the beliefs of the Georgia legislature, electorate, and prosecutors, as revealed by the language of the statute and the state's pattern of non-enforcement. 97 Like the ideas of "immorality," "crime," and "illness" discussed above, each of the dissenters' ideas reflects a particular world view. The idea of "homosexuality as identity" seems to have been invented for selfdescription. In a development related to, and roughly contemporaneous with, the invention of "homosexuality" as a medical category, some lay people adapted the idea to understand themselves and to seek societal tolerance. 9 These self-described homosexuals did not always accept the medical assumption that their condition was an illness (or "perversion") requiring treatment, but they did agree that the gender of a person's desired sex partner revealed something essential about his nature. 9 "
In the 1950s, the nineteenth-century conception of homosexuality as an illness or identity began to be challenged by a new concept: "homosexuality as normal variation." This idea combined the pre-nineteenth-century assumption that a person's sexuality should be evaluated without considering the gender of his object choice with the twentieth-century notion that sexual expression is good and sexual repression, bad. 0 0 The idea that homosexuality is a normal manifestation of human sexuality has gradually achieved scientific acceptance; the American Psychiatric Association formally adopted this position in 1973.1"1 The idea that homosexuality 97. 478 U.S. at 219-20 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 98. Several theories have been advanced to explain the late-19th century emergence of the idea that the "homosexual" was a distinct type of human being. Michel Foucault has theorized that sexuality was "medicalized" for the aggrandizement of doctors and to increase social control. Philippe Aries has suggested that the new concept, "homosexuality," achieved popular acceptance as social changes increased the expectations of emotional closeness in marriage, made married life more restrictive for men with sexual interest in other men, and reduced opportunities for extramarital sexual and emotional bonds between men. See Aries, Love in Married Life and The Indissoluble Marriage, in WESTERN SEXUALITY, supra note 83, at 130-57. Aries' theory may also be used to explain the 19th-century emergence of "homosexuality" as a self-ascribed identity. If a married man has many other intense emotional involvements, and spends a considerable amount of time in a sexsegregated separate sphere, engaging in sexual activity with other men may pose no logistical or emotional problems for him; he may, therefore, do so without particularly noticing it or developing a homosexual identity. But if casual liaisons are less convenient, and marriage itself more emotionally demanding, married life may be less attractive or satisfactory for a man who is sexually attracted to other men. The resulting conflict could be resolved by such a man in several ways, including by adopting (subjectively, discovering) a homosexual identity. It is not surprising that Aries' theory does not explain the phenomenon of female homosexual identity particularly well; that emerged considerably later, see J. LAURITSEN 
100.
See Amicus Brief, supra note 84, at 8 (oral and anal sex are not harmful, but repression of sexual desires may cause dysfunction and pathology).
See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
constitutes a normal variation is consistent with the nineteenth-century idea of homosexuality as an identity only in that both recognize the central part sexuality plays in life. The idea that homosexuality is normal, however, implies a recognition that homosexuality and heterosexuality may be not be rigidly distinct, mutually exclusive, categories. 1 "' It is inconsistent with the nineteenth-century notion that "a homosexual" is fundamentally a different sort of person than "a heterosexual." The various paradigms the Justices used to understand the act for which Hardwick was arrested shaped their responses to his assertion that he was protected by a constitutional right of privacy. The Justices who understood homosexuality to be immoral held it to be therefore utterly unlike the more conventional personal and family interests prior cases had protected, whereas the Justices who understood homosexuality to be normal analogized Hardwick's act to other forms of "intimate association." All of the Justices drew their conceptions of homosexuality from among paradigms current in contemporary society, although the majority's historical justification for its choice of meaning was deeply flawed. 0 3
III. SUBTEXT AND TEXT: THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHIES
UNDERLYING BOWERS V. HARDWICK
The Justices' debate over the scope of constitutional "privacy" masked not only disagreement about the nature of Hardwick's activity, but also a dispute over fundamental values. Two competing political philosophies, classical conservatism and classical liberalism, respectively, underlie the Supreme Court majority and dissenting opinions.'" The Hardwick majority accepted Georgia's argument that even irrational popular prejudices should be enforced in order to preserve the very existence of society, because these prejudices may embody ancient wisdom. This argument resembles the classical conservatism of Edmund Burke and FitzJames Ste-MENTAL DISORDERS 380 (3d ed. 1980); see also Amicus Brief, supra note 84, at 9-10 (describing history of adoption of this model).
102. "Homosexuality" is the exclusive preference of only a small percentage of those who, at some time in their adult lives, either experience sexual desire for, or participate in sexual acts with, persons of their own gender. See A. KINSEY, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN MALE 650-51 (1948) (37% of men have at least some overt homosexual experience to the point of orgasm between adolescence and old age; 10% are more or less exclusively homosexual for at least three years between the ages of 16 and 55); Plummer, Homosexual Categories, in THE MAKING OF THE MODERN HO- MOSEXUAL 
53-75 (1981).
103. See supra Section I-B-1. 104. I use the terms "conservative" and "liberal" with trepidation; these concepts have been used and redefined for so long and in so many ways that they have lost much of their meaning. See, e.g., H. 1 0 5 Justice Blackmun's dissent implied that an individual's right to behave as he chooses may be limited only in order to prevent him from causing harm to others, a view reminiscent of the classical liberalism of Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill. 10 Disputes over similar issues in other contexts have been framed in these terms, most notably the extended written debate between Professor H.L.A. Hart"°' and Lord Patrick Devlin' O 8 when the Wolfenden Committee recommended in 1957 that criminal penalties for private and consensual sexual acts between men be repealed in Great Britain." 9 Thus, the Supreme Court's discussion and resolution of Bowers v. Hardwick was shaped by thirty years of lively public, forensic, 11° and scholarly' 1 ' debate about whether consensual lovemaking between two persons of the same sex ought to be a crime.
A. The Hart-Devlin Debate
The writings of H.L.A. Hart and Patrick Devlin provide a particularly instructive comparison with Bowers v. Hardwick because they consider the underlying philosophical questions raised by Hardwick with depth and rigor. Hart and Devlin debated the political philosophy which undergirded the Wolfenden Report's jurisprudential support for its substantive recommendations: the theory that protection of an individual from external harm was the only valid justification for criminal prohibitions; no other goal, and certainly no other moral theory, could be sufficient. 12 Lord Devlin attacked one of the Wolfenden Report's key premises: that there is a realm of private morality that may not properly be enforced by the criminal law."' Devlin argued that judgments about private morality must be made every day by sentencing judges, 114 and are implicit in the mere proscription of some, although perhaps not all, crimes. 1 1 ' Claiming that the Wolfenden Committee had conceded homosexuality to be morally wrong, Lord Devlin argued against a "freedom to be immoral,"" ' 6 because "[siociety is entitled by means of its laws to protect itself from dangers, whether from within or without." ' 113. He was considerably more troubled by the Wolfenden Committee's rationales than by its recommendations. He conceded that homosexuality does society no tangible harm, P. DEVLIN, Mill on Liberty in Morals, in THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS, supra note 108, at 102, 111-12, 116, and agreed that laws penalizing consensual adult homosexuality may themselves do society more harm than good, id. at 117.
P. DEVLIN, Morals and the Criminal Law, in THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS, supra note
108, at 1, 4 (for example, by treating an abortionist and an unlicensed midwife differently).
115. Id. at 5-7. 116. Id. at 8; cf P. DEVLIN, supra note 113, at 102, 121-22 (moral proscriptions are appropriate even if we are not sure proscribed conduct is evil).
117. P. DEVLIN, supra note 114, at 1. Lord Devlin emphasized the danger of homosexuality by comparing it to treason. Id. at 13-14.
118. Id. at 15. 119. Id. at 17 ("No society can do without intolerance, indignation and disgust; they are the forces behind the moral law, and indeed it can be argued that if they or something like them are not present, the feelings of society cannot be weighty enough to deprive the individual of freedom of choice.") (footnote omitted). 120. Id. at 17 (If society genuinely feels that homosexuality is "a vice so abominable that its mere presence is an offence . . . I do not see how society can be denied the right to eradicate it.").
121. Id. at 18-19; cf Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 197-98 (Powell, J., dissenting) (sug-that the community needed to be able to enforce the majority's moral views in order to preserve its own existence. Lord Devlin's arguments were explicitly and self-consciously conservative. Indeed, he argued that basing the law upon rational considerations would be undemocratic and elitist.' 22 He acknowledged that his argument that the law should enforce majoritarian morality was conservative, naming James FitzJames Stephen as his intellectual ancestor.' 2 Like Lord Devlin, Professor Hart was at least as interested in the Wolfenden Committee's jurisprudential theory as in its practical recommendations. 2 4 His arguments therefore defended both John Stuart Mill and the Wolfenden Report, and attacked the theories of Edmund Burke and FitzJames Stephen along with those propounded by Lord Devlin himself.' 2 5 In defending the Wolfenden Committee's jurisprudence, Hart argued that although "we should attempt to adjust the severity of punishment to the moral gravity of offences," it does not follow "that punishment merely for immorality is justified." Hart explained that although "the only justification for having a system of punishment is to prevent harm and only harmful conduct should be punished," nevertheless using moral judgments to decide on the quantum of punishment for harmful conduct may support social morality and prevent the law from falling into disrepute. 2 " Pointing out that criminal laws affect both those persons actually punished under them and those persons "coerced into obedience by the threat of legal punishment," Hart argued that proscribing harmless sexual activities was particularly pernicious because of the "recurrent and insistent part" sexual impulses play in daily life: "[T]he suppression of sexual impulses generally is[] something which affects the development or balance of the individual's emotional life, happiness, and personality." 2 7
Professor Hart characterized Lord Devlin's argument that society must enforce majoritarian morality to protect itself as "a highly ambitious empirical generalization" for which Devlin had offered neither evidence nor even any "indication . . . of the kind of evidence that would support gesting that homosexual lovemaking may be made a crime, but not punished too severely).
122. it."' 28 Professor Hart acknowledged that it might be possible to discriminate empirically between those portions of society's moral code necessary for social existence and those that were superfluous, but noted that it would be difficult to do so.' 2 9 Until empirical evidence demonstrating the necessity for any particular moral rule was available, Hart concluded, Lord Devlin's arguments rested entirely upon the "conservative thesis"
that "the majority have the right to enforce its . . . convictions that their moral environment is a thing of value to be defended from change."' 3 0 One of Lord Devlin's most enduring contributions to the debate about the role of morality in the criminal law was his development of a list of existing crimes which he used to challenge the liberal argument that "private immorality should altogether and always be immune from interference by the law.""' This list included: treason, 132 euthanasia or the killing of another at his own request, suicide, attempted suicide and suicide pacts, dueling, abortion, incest between brother and sister, gambling, drunkenness, living on the earnings of a prostitute, bestiality, conspiracy to corrupt morals, bigamy, and polygamy.' Some version of Lord Devlin's list has become a staple in arguments over whether private lovemaking between consenting adults should be legal,' 3 and a version of it appears in Bowers v. Hardwick." 5 Professor Hart responded to Devlin's list in two ways. First, he argued that "'the actual existence of laws of any given kind is wholly irrelevant to [the] contention . . . that it would be better if laws of such a kind did 128. Hart, Social Solidarity, supra note 107, at 3. As Professor Hart recognized:
[I]f we mean by "society ceasing to exist" not "disintegration" nor "the drifting apart" of its members, but a radical change in its common morality, then the case for using the law to preserve morality must rest not on any disintegration thesis but on some variant of the claim that when groups of men have developed a common form of life rich enough to include a common morality, this is something which ought to be preserved. One very obvious form of this claim is the conservative thesis that the majority have a right in these circumstances to defend their existing moral environment from change. But this is no longer an empirical claim. 42 would have required proof that private homosexual lovemaking was harmful before permitting the state to proscribe it. These differences reflect, respectively, the conservative position, for which the desirability of protecting society's existing form is unquestioned, and the liberal position, for which individual liberty is the primary value. Liberal values and conservative values are incommensurable. Although one can make an intelligible choice between them, this cannot be done from an Archimedean perspective.
Id. at 4 (emphasis in original
In addition to his misleading historical claims, White relied on "the presumed belief of a majority of the Georgia electorate that homosexual sodomy is immoral and unacceptable."' 14 Although careful analysis suggests that White was working within the conservative perspective, his majoritarian justification can be interpreted in both conservative and liberal ways. The conservative interpretation assumes that White agreed with Fitzjames Stephen and Lord Patrick Devlin that strongly held popular prejudices are by themselves sufficient justification for criminal proscriptions. The liberal interpretation assumes that White accepted Jeremy Bentham's principle that criminal proscriptions must be limited to curbing behavior causing harm to others. Many of the dissenters' arguments, and almost all of the scholarly commentary, have been written from within the liberal perspective, and assume White to have been asserting that homosexuality is harmful.'" Yet White's argument fails in liberal terms, since he never attempts to identify any harm caused by consensual adult sodomy. 4 In conservative terms, however, White's argument is coherent. When he relied on "the presumed belief of a majority of the Georgia electorate," White meant that Georgia might proscribe homosexuality solely because it was abhorred by the majority. When he compiled a list strikingly similar to Lord Devlin's by comparing "homosexual sodomy" to " [v] ictimless crimes, such as the possession and use of illegal drugs [,] .. possession in the home of drugs, firearms, or stolen goods [,] . . . adultery, incest, and other sexual crimes," 4 6 White, like Devlin, was arguing that society often legislates on the basis of morality alone, and that this is entirely proper.
Blackmun explicitly repudiated White's conservative premises at some points, 4 " but at others merely implicitly assumed the primacy of liberal values. Although, as just argued, Justice White's opinion is more coherent when understood in conservative terms, Justice Blackmun sometimes interpreted it as a liberal argument. Treating White's use of his Devlin-like list as shorthand for the liberal argument that all these crimes cause harm, Blackmun retorted that private, consensual, violations of Georgia's law were obviously neither the cause nor the effect of harm to any individual. 14 8 Blackmun's implicit assertion that the crimes on White's list are proscribed because they harm identifiable individuals may be correct for most of the crimes. Adultery 14 and sexual crimes involving the use of actual or constructive force 1 50 may be distinguished from "homosexual preted as protecting either homosexuals or other citizens from harm); Gillerman, supra note 7, at 6 (criticizing equation of homosexuality with moral corruption because such equation "lacks empirical foundation"); Richards, supra note 7, at 859-60 (because homosexuality is not harmful, treating it differently from other nonprocreative sexuality is unjust); Leading Cases, supra note 7, at 219 (Court should have required "an independent rational basis" for Georgia's law, "something more than the moral choice of a majority").
145. Within the liberal paradigm, any defense of Georgia's law must be on the basis that "homosexual sodomy" causes some sort of harm, and therefore, since the Georgia electorate had determined homosexuality to be harmful to society, it was justified in proscribing it. Cf P. DEVLIN, supra note 114, at 1, 9-14 (society may use the criminal law to preserve morality in order to safeguard its own existence). This argument has been convincingly refuted by Ronald Dworkin. See R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 242 (1978) (noting that public outrage alone does not indicate that given prohibition is necessary to society's continuation); see also 478 U.S. at 210-12 (Blackmun, J. dissenting) (making same point).
146. 478 U.S. at 195-96. 147. Blackmun attacked conservative premises directly when he wrote, "Like Justice Holmes, I believe that '[iut is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV,'" 478 U.S. at 199 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897)), and, "I cannot agree that either the length of time a majority has held its convictions or the passions with which it defends them can withdraw legislation from this Court's scrutiny." 478 U.S. at 210 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
148. Id. at 208-09. Like Justice Blackmun, Professor Hart responded to the list from within the framework of liberal values, arguing that the state's ability to enforce some morality can give it the power to prohibit homosexual acts only if some matter of appropriate state concern is linked to the specific prohibition. Hart, Social Solidarity, supra note 107, at 9 n.21.
149. 478 U.S. at 209 n.4 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (state may punish adultery as breach of promise to be faithful, or because it harms third parties).
150. Such crimes include rape, forcible sodomy, statutory rape, child molestation, and incest be-sodomy" on this basis. Yet incest between adults 15 ' is not clearly harmful. 152 Blackmun's own liberal assumptions prevented him from recognizing that White's use of the list was shorthand for the conservative argument that the criminal law may properly be used "to preserve order and decency."' 53 Professor Hart responded to this argument by requesting empirical evidence of the necessity for any criminal prohibition based upon morality; had Blackmun done so, his rhetorical position would have been stronger. Instead, Justice Blackmun attempted to refute the majority's argument on liberal terms by seeking to distinguish homosexual love from incest between adults. He may have tried to do so in order to contain the anarchic risks implied by a rule favoring individual sexual freedom." Yet he set himself a formidable task, because incest between adults seems not to cause any discernable harm to an identifiable individual.
The dissenters' most creative responses to the majority pushed beyond the Hart-Devlin debate, turning the conservative argument against itself. Instead of accepting the assertion that homosexuality is universally considered immoral, as Hart implicitly did, Stevens denied that homosexuality is abhorred even in Georgia. 55 Blackmun did not challenge this factual premise. Recalling that the values of pluralistic diversity and individual liberty form a traditional part of our society's morality, he paradoxically asserted that these liberal values should be considered paramount in constitutional interpretation, even by those who consider conserving our society in its present form a primary value.' 5 5 IV.
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY AND CONSTITUTIONAL PRIVACY
Commentators have found it difficult to explain how Michael Hardwick's challenge to a law proscribing private lovemaking between consenting adults could have failed. One suggested that the case heralds a tween a child and an adult.
151. At oral argument, the Court expressed particular concern with the states' continuing ability to proscribe a sexual relationship between adults who are within prohibited degrees of consanguinity or affinity. 152. Blackmun's argument that incest is "inherently coercive" is anomalous: If structural inequality between two people makes their lovemaking "sufficiently problematical that a blanket prohibition • . . is warranted," 478 U.S. at 209 n.4 (Blackmun, J., dissenting), all heterosexual lovemaking should also be prohibited. [Vol. 97: 1073 "second death of substantive due process"; 15 another called it "one of the most transparently unprincipled exercises of judicial power in recent years.' pute pitting liberty against tradition requires a balance between potential anarchy and potential tyranny. A court's assessment of the potential risk of any result must therefore depend heavily on how the facts are construed. In Hardwick, each Justice's calculation of the relative dangers of a liberal or a conservative decision was determined by his or her understanding of the act for which Hardwick was arrested.
If homosexuality is intrinsically immoral, as Justice White and Chief Justice Burger implicitly asserted, a liberal decision might well be the more dangerous. Depriving the state of the power to arrest and punish an adult for engaging in intrinsically immoral behavior might undermine its power to curb other traditionally disfavored but private and consensual practices, such as suicide, drug use, adultery, and incest. The risk of a liberal decision could then be discussed in terms of a need for a limiting principle, 165 an answer to the question, "Where will it end?" If homosexuality is a normal variation, however, as the dissenters implicitly asserted, a conservative decision might easily be the more dangerous. If homosexual love is as normal as any other, a conservative decision risks government enforcement of a majority's intolerance in other sensitive areas of life as well. The relevant comparisons are then not between homosexuality and incest or suicide, but between homophobia and religious intolerance or racial animus. 1 66 If a state may proscribe and punish a "sensitive, key relationship of human existence" such as sexual love, few limits remain on its control of individual autonomy, and on its imposition of majority preferences upon minorities with other values. 6 The Justices' assessment of the risk inherent in the classical liberal and conservative resolutions of this case in turn determined how they applied the doctrine of constitutional privacy to the facts of Hardwick. The Court's prior decisions invoking constitutional privacy may be interpreted in both liberal and conservative terms. One liberal interpretation of "privacy" is as "autonomy." This concept is fully consistent with the classical liberal view that individual liberty is a primary value. 1 8 In contrast, one conservative interpretation of privacy is that it guarantees no more than "seclusion" for otherwise legal activities. 69 This view is consistent with making society's unchanged continuation a primary value. Interpreting privacy as protection only for traditional relationships 7 0 is conservative for the same reason. 171 In Hardwick, the Justices in the majority neither explained which of these definitions of privacy they were invoking, nor articulated the understandings of homosexuality they held before they compared Hardwick's actions with the facts of prior casesY' 2 This silence obscured the underlying determinants of their opinions.
In the Hart-Devlin debate, once both sides had articulated their positions fully, it became clear that their disagreements were over fundamentally distinct and incommensurable normative frameworks, and therefore that the debate was incapable of resolution by reasoned argument. In Bowers v. Hardwick, however, conservatism appears to have won along with the state of Georgia. On the basis of profoundly conservative arguments the case denied constitutional protection to a politically weak minority woefully in need of equal treatment."' The decision's potential for undermining the entire liberal privacy doctrine 1 4 is greatest if homosexuality is understood as a normal variation, because Hardwick then implies that a state may proscribe any intimate relationship or decision. Future litigants will therefore experience a strong temptation to limit the decision's precedential effect by distinguishing themselves from homosexuals, perhaps even on the basis that homosexuality has "always been abhorred." Seen in this way, the case is an impressive victory for conservative values. It may shift the argument about whether an activity is protected by the constitutional right of privacy from the liberal paradigm, where individual liberty is protected unless it sufficiently endangers society, to the conservative paradigm, where state restrictions are upheld so long as they are sufficiently consistent with "traditional values." Nevertheless, scoring the winners and losers in this case is really not so simple. The probable effects of this decision are both complex and paradoxical. In some respects, conservatism lost as well. The "presumed belief of a majority of the electorate in Georgia" ' ' 7 5 is no more than shorthand for a circular argument: The statute was justified by reliance on popular morality. But popular morality itself was supposedly evidenced by the statute's mere existence. Seen in this way, the decision is a defeat for the conservative principle of deference to majoritarian values. Contrary to their protestations, the Justices of the Hardwick majority ignored the explicit language of Georgia's law and the actual conduct of its law enforcement officers in order to impose their own values 1 6 on the states under a cloak of historical invention. Stephen implied that criminal laws could be adequately justified by strong popular prejudice because a prejudiced majority might otherwise use mob violence to enforce its views. 11 8 These ideas were perhaps sound in Stephen's place and time, but the United States in the latter half of the twentieth century is a pluralistic mixture of cultures and values. In our country, and our century, it is not at all clear that domestic peace is advanced when a majority imposes its values on the rest of society. Justice Blackmun put it well: In a pluralistic society, attempting to compel adherence to one set of values and beliefs may well constitute a greater threat to "national cohesion" 17 ' 9 than mere pluralism ever could be.
V. CONCLUSION
Although Bowers v. Hardwick appears to be an incremental step in the Court's exegesis of its privacy doctrine based on fact and history, the opinions really turn on the Justices' unstated disagreements over fundamental political values. The majority applied classical conservative principles, permitting Georgia to justify its statute by its congruence with traditional moral views. It grounded this argument in the Constitution by equating "tradition" with the views of the Founders. The dissenters challenged the majority on two levels: Blackmun accepted the factual premise that homosexuality was abhorred when the Constitution was adopted, but rejected the notion that this is constitutionally significant, and Stevens challenged this factual premise itself. As both Hardwick and the Hart-Devlin debate show, the dispute between classical liberalism and classical conservatism cannot be resolved by resort to a meta-ethical methodology. What is clear in Hardwick, however, as Stevens noted, is that the majority's historical claims were inaccurate. Its attempt to ground its holding in American and Western history must be judged a failure.
If the majority had understood the history of sodomy statutes, it would have found it harder to limit its consideration of the Georgia statute to its effects upon a politically weak minority. 8 An accurate assessment of the 1791 and 1868 statutes would have made the implications of the Court's method much plainer. If the framers' values are represented by these statutes, then "sodomy" between a man and a woman, even within marriage, has no more protection than sodomy between two men. By mischaracterizing history and misunderstanding "homosexuality," the majority was able to make a profound change in constitutional interpretation, from the liberal to the conservative paradigm, without acknowledging either that it had done so or the implications of this shift.
180. The Court explicitly reserved consideration of the constitutionality of the Georgia statute as applied to "acts of sodomy" between parties other than homosexuals. 478 U.S. at 188 n.2. Yet given that heterosexual sodomy, including sodomy in marriage, was also proscribed in 1791 and 1868, it is difficult to see how the majority's historical method of constitutional interpretation could produce any result other than finding heterosexual sodomy constitutionally unprotected.
